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STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION CERTIFIED
This Court has accepted the following question for certification:
"Whether provision of lower limits for underinsured motorist coverage than for
liability coverage, properly complies with former Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b)
and 31A-22-305(9)(g) (currently codified under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3)."
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i)

waives the higher coverage;

(ii)

reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage;

and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy.

(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1,
2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) (2001). A complete copy of this statute was attached
to Plaintiffs brief as Addendum "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Carter and Glenada Iverson (the "Iversons") insured their automobile with
Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") under the
same policy from August 1981 through the date of the accident giving rise to the subject
lawsuit. On several occasions subsequent to January 1, 2001, State Farm explained to the
Iversons the costs and purposes of uninsured ("UM") and underinsured ("UIM") motorist
coverage and invited them to purchase such coverage in an amount equal to the liability
limits set forth under their Policy. Despite being so informed, the Iversons opted to
maintain their UIM coverage at its existing limit.
Plaintiff now seeks to revoke the Iversons' rejection of higher UIM limits on the
basis that changes to that Policy after January 1, 2001, involving a substitution in vehicles
and an update in State Farm's standard policy form, created a new policy, requiring a
new offer of UIM coverage. The Iversons do not dispute that their coverage under the
Policy remained in continuous force during that entire period.
This matter is before this Court upon the Certification of Question of State Law by
the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
The UM/UIM Notices
On February 27, 2001, State Farm sent a renewal notice to the Iversons (R. at
105), insureds for whom it had been providing automobile insurance coverage since 1981
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under policy number 479 7848 (the "Policy"). (R. at 65, 68). That notice informed the
Iversons of the costs and benefits associated with UM and UIM coverage and invited
them to purchase such coverage at amounts greater than those which currently existed
under their State Farm policy. (R. at 105, 145-46), Specifically, the renewal notice
included the following language:
Please read the enclosed insert titled IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES.
If you want to increase your [UM or UIM] limits to equal your Bodily Injury
Liability Coverage limits or $250,000/$500,000 (whichever is less), please contact
your agent.
(R. at 105).

Along with that notice, State Farm included an insert which further

expounded on UM/UIM coverage. (R. at 72). That insert stated as follows:
Utah law requires that auto policyholders carry Uninsured Motor Vehicle
(Coverage U) and Underinsured Motor Vehicle (Coverage W) with limits equal to
the lesser of:
1. the policyholder's Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits, or
2. $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
However, you may, in writing, reject either Coverage U or Coverage W or select
lower limits for either or both of these coverages.
Coverage U provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has
no liability insurance to compensate you for your bodily injuries.
Coverage W provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has
liability insurance, but not enough to compensate for your bodily injuries.

3

Your Bodily Injury Liability Coverage, Coverage U, and Coverage W limits are
shown on your enclosed renewal notice. Following are the Coverage U and W
limits available and the applicable premium for each.
(R. at 145-46). The insert proceeded to list various UM/UIM limits and the corresponding
premiums for each, then closed with the following notice:
If you want to increase your Coverage U or Coverage W limits to equal your
Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits (but not more than $250,000 per person
and $500,000 per accident), or if you have any questions, please contact your State
Farm agent. If you want to keep the limits you have, no action is needed.
(R. at 146).
State Farm included the same language and insert with its next renewal notice,
dated August 27, 2001 (R. at 108), then again in three subsequent renewal notices, dated
February 27, 2004, August 27, 2004, and February 27, 2005. (R. at 73, 121, 123, 126).
And even on several occasions prior to 2001, State Farm had informed the Iversons of the
purpose of UM/UIM coverage and offered them the opportunity to purchase it in higher
amounts. (R. at 131-33). Despite being provided with those numerous opportunities to
obtain greater UIM coverage, the Iversons took no action, thereby opting to maintain
such coverage at the existing amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident.
(R. at 87-126).
The Accident and UIM Offer
On July 4, 2005, the Iversons were killed in a head-on collision while traveling in
their PT Cruiser. (R. at 149-50). Plaintiff subsequently made a claim for UIM benefits
under the Iversons' Policy. (R. at 25, 31). Just one month after the accident, State Farm
offered its UIM limits of $10,000 for Mr. Iverson and $10,000 for Mrs. Iverson, for a
4

total of $20,000. (R. at 152). However, Plaintiff has taken the position that State Farm
was required to increase the Iversons' UIM limits to make them equal to the liability
limits set forth under the Policy. (R. at 197-98). As such, Plaintiff rejected State Farm's
repeated offers of the $20,000 limit (R. at 26, 31) and instead filed suit against State Farm
on August 9, 2006, stating claims for breach of contract and bad faith. (R. at 49).
The Policy
As opposed to insurance policies offered by some other carriers, which cover
multiple cars under the same policy, State Farm policies only cover a single vehicle on
one policy. (R. at 87-126). The Policy language established that coverage would be
provided for any car replacing the one previously insured under the policy, so long as
State Farm is asked to insure it within thirty days of delivery and any additional premium
amount is paid. (R. at 300). The Iversons replaced the vehicle covered under the Policy
on several occasions. (R. at 90, 92, 119). The final replacement took place in April
2003, when the Iversons requested that a 2001 PT Cruiser be substituted for the 1995
Chevy van previously covered under the Policy. (R. at 78, 119, 143).
In August 2001, State Farm made a periodic update to its standard policy form.
(R. at 304). This policy form update made no substantive changes to the coverages
provided to the Iversons under the Policy. (R. at 304; 3 5 5-407). * Such an update was
anticipated by the language of the Policy itself, which explained that some changes would
be made to the policy form over the life of the policy and specified that such changes
1

As discussed further below, the form update primarily incorporated minor changes
which had previously been made by endorsement. (See Addendum "C".)
5

would not create a new policy. (R. at 374). Specifically, the Conditions section of the
Policy states that the terms of the Policy may be changed by endorsement or by the
revision of the policy form. (R. at 374). Furthermore, that section also specified that
unless State Farm mailed the Iversons a "notice of cancellation or notice of our intention
not to renew the policy," State Farm would continue to renew the policy upon payment of
the renewal premium. (R. at 375).
When State Farm made the above changes in vehicles and policy forms, the letter
code found on the end of the Iversons' policy number changed to reflect the differences.
(R. at 111, 119, 304). However, the base policy number, 479 7848, has remained the
same throughout the life of the Policy. (R. at 70, 137-38, 295). Change codes are used
by State Farm to identify which declarations are in effect and to track changes in an
existing policy such as a change in vehicle. (R. at 294-95). After the Iversons substituted
vehicles in 2003, State Farm issued a Declarations Page which documented the
substitution and related change in letter code by informing the Iversons that the current
Declarations Page had "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E". (R. at 259).
Aside from those changes set forth above, the only other differences in the Policy
subsequent to January 1, 2001 were slight variations in premiums from one policy period
to the next. (R. at 103-26). Such changes in pricing are not handled through State
Farm's underwriting department, as premiums are set by actuaries in State Farm's
corporate headquarters.

(R. at 70).

When discussing the difference between

underwriting and pricing, State Farm representative Tammy Chase testified as follows:
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Underwriting takes into consideration eligibility guidelines, what
your driving record's like, things like that. The actual rating of the
policy then, the price you're going to charge, can depend on who's
driving the car, what coverages you choose, where that car is
garaged, the territory, things like that. The classification how that car
is used.
So there's a difference in being eligible and underwriting for
coverage for acceptability for eligibility and then choosing what —
determining what rate is appropriate then for that risk, that
underwriting risk that's presented.
(R. at 68). She further testified that "[t]here are two separate functions. Underwriting
eligibility and then rating. They're two separate functions." (R. at 70). She also clearly
indicated that "underwriting has nothing to do with setting a premium amount" (R. at 71),
and that a change in vehicles changes the pricing of the risk, but not necessarily the
underwriting. (R. at 68). Although Ms. Chase did indicate that a material change to the
Policy could potentially impact pricing, at no point did she state that any change in
pricing was material. (R. at 254-55).
Except for the minor ones detailed above, there were no changes to the Policy on
or after January 1, 2001. (R. at 103-26). The coverage limits in place on the Policy prior
to January 1, 2001 remained the same through the end of the Policy. (R. at 103-26).
Furthermore, there was no change in drivers listed under the Policy from 2001 on, and
Carter Iverson was the only named insured under the Policy during its entire duration.
(R. at 103-26). The Iversons were never asked to complete another application once the
Policy was initially obtained and there were no additional insureds added to the Policy
after January 1, 2001. (R. at 103-26).
7

Insureds benefit greatly from the existence of a continuous policy. (R. at 70, 75).
First, they are not required to repeat the application process, as they are when they obtain
a new policy. (R. at 70, 75). Furthermore, they are able to maintain time accrued toward
any discounts. (R. at 70, 75). For instance, State Farm provides a discount for policies
remaining in force and accident-free for at least three years. (R. at 106). The longer the
policy remains in force and accident-free, the greater the discount. (R. at 106). The
Iversons benefited from such a discount. (R. at 105-26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9), an insurer is only required to obtain
a written UIM election/waiver from an insured on new policies written on or after
January 1, 2001. The statute does not define the term "new policies", but courts
interpreting that term have held that an existing policy is only converted into a new
policy if it undergoes some sort of significant change that alters the nature of the risk
covered under the policy.
State Farm issued its policy to the Iversons long before January 1, 2001, and no
material changes were made after that date which would convert it into a new policy.
There was no change in policy limits, nor did the Iversons complete a new application.
At no time was the number of vehicles insured under the policy increased, and there were
no additional insureds added to the policy. The only changes involved the substitution of
one vehicle for another and the updating of State Farm's standard policy form. Courts
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have widely held that such changes are not material and therefore do not create a new
policy.
Inasmuch as the Iversons' policy existed prior to January 1, 2001, State Farm was
required to include in its first two renewal notices an explanation of the costs associated
with UIM coverage, along with the purposes of such coverage. State Farm did just that,
and then went on to include the explanation in three additional renewal notices.
The purpose of § 31A-22-305(9) is to ensure that insureds are adequately informed
with regard to UIM coverage.

State Farm made every effort to comply with its

obligations under that statute, and the legislative intent was fulfilled in this instance, as
the Iversons were thoroughly informed concerning UIM coverage on numerous
occasions. The Iversons were given multiple opportunities to increase their existing UIM
coverage, but decided not to do so. Mandating a higher level of coverage despite that
informed decision could potentially destroy, in large part, the benefits an insured enjoys
from continuous coverage under a policy.
ARGUMENT
INASMUCH AS STATE FARM DID NOT WRITE A "NEW POLICY" TO
THE IVERSONS ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001, IT FULFILLED ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 31A-22-305(9) BY
INFORMING THE IVERSONS OF THEIR OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO
UIM COVERAGE THROUGH NUMEROUS RENEWAL NOTICES.
In 2000, the Utah legislature enacted legislation intended to insure that insureds
are aware of the purpose of UM/UIM as well as the various options associated with such
coverage under their automobile policies of insurance. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9); General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, ^[11. That legislation
9

established two separate and distinct methods by which insureds were to be so informed,
one method applicable to new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, and one
applicable to policies in existence prior to that time. See id.
Inasmuch as State Farm had issued Iversons policy long before January 1, 2001, it
complied with the requirements applicable to existing policies by providing the required
information in numerous renewal notices sent subsequent to January 1, 2001. Indeed,
State Farm went beyond what was required in providing that information, and the
Iversons were well-informed of their options with regard to UIM coverage. After being
so informed, the Iversons made an educated decision to maintain their UIM coverage at
its existing level, instead of increasing the coverage. As such, a greater level of coverage
should not now be mandated, as so doing would create a substantial and unintended
burden on insurers.
A. A signed waiver of UIM coverage is only required on new policies
written on or after January 1,2001.
According to legislation passed in 2000, insurers must provide UIM coverage
"equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits" available under the insured's policy on
"new policies written on or after January 1, 2001 . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(b) (2001) (emphasis added.) The statute also permits insureds with such "new"
policies to choose UIM coverage in lesser amounts should they not wish to pay the costs
associated with coverage at greater amounts.

An insured may purchase the lesser

amount, or waive UIM coverage entirely, "by signing an acknowledgment form provided
10

by the insurer that: (i) waives the higher coverage; (ii) reasonably explains the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage; and (iii) discloses the additional premiums required to
purchase underinsured motorist coverage" at the various limits. IcL
B. State Farm did not write a new policy for the Iversons on or after
January 1, 2001 because no material changes were made to the
policy that was in existence prior to that date.
The above requirements only apply to "new policies written on or after January 1,
2001." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(b) (2001). Plaintiff does not dispute that the
Iversons had a policy in place with State Farm on January 1, 2001. (See Plaintiffs Brief
at 17.) Therefore, at issue is whether some change occurred to that policy, on or after
January 1, 2001, which converted it into a "new policy." As set forth below, no such
change occurred.
The Utah legislature has not defined the term "new policy." However, the Tenth
Circuit has noted that a new policy is created when there has been a material change to
the type of risk insured by an existing policy. See May v. Naf 1 Union Fire Ins. Co., 84
F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1996). A material change is one which alters the type of risk
being covered. See Johnson v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98-4120, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16049, at *21 (10th Cir. July 11, 2000). (Attached as Addendum "A".) In

2

Plaintiff spends a great deal of time discussing what are described as changes to the
Iverson policy prior to January 1, 2001. Such changes are irrelevant as concerning the
issue before this Court as Plaintiff recognized in her Summary of the Argument, in which
she states that "the myriad changes and circumstances demonstrate that the Iverson's
coverage changed materially after the legislature enacted a written waiver requirement."
(See Plaintiffs Brief at 13.) As such, State Farm will focus its brief on those changes
which took place subsequent to January 1, 2001.
11

the context of statutory UMAJIM selection/rejection requirements, "'[t]he determinant
question is whether the change in the policy is material to the initial selection or waiver
of UM coverage that would require the execution of a new selection or waiver.'" Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 490, 500 (Haw. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Lenard, 694 So.
2d 574, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1997)). That change "must have a significant impact on the
legal relationship and obligations between insurer and insured under the policy ...." Id.
A substantial increase or decrease in coverage limits is widely considered to be
one such material change.

See e ^ May, 84 F.3d at 1346 ($2 million reduction in

liability coverage constituted the issuance of a new policy as opposed to a renewal);
Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 817 P.2d 841, 849 (Wash. 1991) (nothing that "where
coverage levels remain constant, the majority of jurisdictions support the conclusion that
no new policy is created"). Other potential material changes include increasing the
number of insured vehicles or adding an additional insured to the policy. See Millet v.
Imperial Fire and Cas. Ins., 887 So. 2d 603, 606 (La. Ct. App. 2004). Furthermore,
courts will often consider whether a new application was completed in determining
whether a new policy was issued. See e j ^ Chatlas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 892 N.E.2d 106,
110 (111. App. Ct. 2008).
No such changes occurred to the Iversons' Policy subsequent to January 1, 2001.
The coverage limits set forth under the Policy remained the same that entire period. (R.
at 103-26). The number of insured vehicles did not increase nor were any additional
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insureds added to the Policy during that time. (R. at 103-26). And the Iversons were not
required to complete a new application at any point.
Plaintiff has essentially argued that a change in vehicles and in policy forms
converted the prior policy into a new policy. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 16-17.) However,
such changes are not considered material and therefore do not create a new policy.
1. The replacement of a vehicle under an existing policy does not
create a new policy.
The replacement of a vehicle on an existing policy does not create a new policy.
See Millet 887 So. 2d at 606-07; Dodd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004). Gasch v. Harris, 808 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Wells v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 185 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970);
Johnson, 817 P.2d at 849.

Rather, the "mere substitution of automobiles with no

additional changes in coverage constitutes the renewal of an existing policy." See Gasch,
808 So. 2d at 1262 (emphasis added). By contrast, the addition of another vehicle to a
policy, as opposed to the replacement of a vehicle, may create a new policy because the
nature of the insured risk would be materially changed. See Dodd, 999 P.3d at 1223
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); but see Makela v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 497 N.E.2d
483 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that even the addition of a new vehicle does not create a
new policy).
In Millet, the insured purchased UM coverage with limits lower than those
applicable to his liability coverage. Millet, 887 So. 2d at 605. The insured subsequently
replaced one of his vehicles with a newer model. After being involved in an accident
13

with the replacement vehicle, the insured claimed that he had intended to obtain UM
coverage equal to his liability coverage at the time he replaced the vehicle on his policy.
However, the court held that the replacement vehicle did not create a new policy.
Therefore, the insurer had no obligation to provide a new UM selection form at that time.
Id at 606-07.
And in Johnson, the statute at issue established that the requirement of a written
rejection of UIM coverage did not apply to renewal or replacement policies. Johnson,
817 P.2d at 849. The court then went on to find that the replacement of an automobile
under the policy at issue did not create a new policy, and that the existing UIM limits set
forth under the policy applied because the statute did not "require insurers to reoffer full
UIM coverage on renewal policies." Id.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish some of the cases set forth above based on slight
differences between the governing statutes of those states and Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22305(9)(b). (See Plaintiffs Brief at 21-22.) Some of those statutes do incorporate terms
such as "renewal", "replacement", "reinstatement", "substitute", or "amended" in
describing policies for which the obligation to obtain a written waiver of higher UIM
coverage does not apply. Plaintiff argues that such language makes those statutes "much
broader than Utah's - the Utah legislature chose to allow an exception to written waivers
only for renewals . . .." (See Plaintiffs Brief at 21.) However, in making that contention
Plaintiff misstates Section 31A-22-305(9).

As set forth above, that section simply

juxtaposes "new" policies with "existing" policies. By so doing, the legislature has
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created a broad exception to written waivers, for if a policy does not qualify as a "new"
policy, it must therefore be an "existing" policy. And the above cases are unanimous in
holding that replacing a vehicle under an existing policy does not create a new policy.
Furthermore, even if the Utah legislature had truly intended to only waive the
written waiver requirement in strict renewal situations, the replacement of a vehicle under
an existing policy is no more than a renewal of that policy. See Gasch, 808 So. 2d at
1262; Johnson, 817 P.2d at 849. Indeed, the term "renewal" has been defined as "[t]he
substitution of a new right or obligation for another of the same nature." Black's Law
Dictionary 899 (6th ed. 1991). By replacing one vehicle under a policy with another, an
insurer is doing nothing more than switching the same obligations from one vehicle to
another, as opposed to assuming an additional risk.
Plaintiff cites several cases in support of her argument that the mere
replacement of a vehicle constitutes a material change in the policy. (See Plaintiffs Brief
at 24-28.) However, upon close review, even those cases help establish that a change in
vehicles, standing alone, does not create a new policy. First, in Withrow v. Pickard, 905
P.2d 800 (Okla. 1995), the court found that the addition of a new vehicle to the policy,
not the replacement of a vehicle, created a new policy. Importantly, that decision was
based in part on Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673 (Okla. 1987).
In Beauchamp, the insureds originally rejected UM coverage on a policy covering two
vehicles. They later requested coverage for a third vehicle under the policy, and no UIM
coverage was offered at that time. Id. at 674. In finding that the addition of a new
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vehicle created a new policy, thereby mandating a new offer of UM coverage, the court
reasoned that the "vehicle was not a substitute for one of those insured under the original
policy." Rather, an additional vehicle was added, necessitating an additional premium.
As such, the original policy had undergone a material change, as opposed to a renewal.
Id. at 676. See also Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d at 500 (finding that as opposed to merely
substituting vehicles, the insured added a vehicle, which led to an additional premium
and the creation of a new policy).
Plaintiffs other cases can also be distinguished because they involve situations in
which in addition to replacing a vehicle, the policy underwent some sort of material
change. See Whalev v. Allstate Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1023, 1026 (D.C. Del. 1984) (in
addition to substitution of vehicles, a vehicle was also eliminated from the policy); Arms
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 360 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (also involved the
addition of collision and comprehensive coverage); Folstad v. Farmers Ins., 210 N.W.2d
238 (Minn. 1973) (adding a new driver to the policy made it more than a renewal).
Furthermore, Arms, a case relied upon heavily by Plaintiff, has since been superseded by
statute. See Matnev v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., No. 88C-AP-135, 1989 Del. Super.
LEXIS 298, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 7, 1989). (Attached as Addendum "B".) As
noted in Matney, Arms was decided under a previous statute which required carriers to
reoffer UM coverage each time a vehicle was added or substituted on a policy. Id
In 2003, the Iversons substituted a 2001 PT Cruiser for the Chevrolet that had
previously been covered under the policy. (R. at 78, 119, 143). Under the case law set
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forth above, such a substitution does not create a new policy. As opposed to the cases
relied upon by Plaintiff, the Iversons did not add an additional vehicle to their existing
policy, nor did they make any material changes to their policy.
Considering a replacement vehicle to merely be an extension of an existing policy,
as opposed to the creation of a new policy, is consistent with the contractual obligations
imposed upon insurers in most policies. Such an obligation was recognized by the court
in Wells. That case involved a "replacement vehicles" provision, which established that
coverage would be provided for such a vehicle "provided it replaces the described
automobile . . . and notice of its acquisition is given [to the insurer] within 30 days of the
date of its delivery to such named insured . . .." Wells, 185 N.W.2d at 148. The court
recognized that "[i]n extending the insurance coverage to the new automobile, the
insurance company was merely providing the insureds with that which it had already
bound itself to provide . . . . " Id. at 150. As such, the replacement of a vehicle under that
policy did not create a new policy, and therefore a UM statute that had gone into effect
subsequent to the original issuance of the policy did not come into play. Id. at 150; see
also Makela, 497 N.E.2d at 488-89 (basing holding in part on the fact that the insurer
"had contracted to insure any car on the declarations page, including any replacement,
substitute, and additional cars ....")
Just as in Wells and Makela, State Farm was only providing the coverage it had
bound itself to provide when it replaced the Chevrolet with the PT Cruiser. The terms of
the Iversons' policy established that coverage would be provided for any car replacing
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the car that was previously insured under the Policy, so long as State Farm is asked to
insure it within thirty days of delivery and any additional premium amount is paid. (R. at
300). Furthermore, State Farm agreed to continue to renew the Policy, unless it provided
the Iversons with a notice of cancellation. (R. at 375). Inasmuch as State Farm was
simply complying with its obligations under the Policy by extending coverage to the PT
Cruiser, such a substitution of vehicles does not create a new policy.
Plaintiff also claims that a change in premiums, such as the one associated with
the vehicle replacement, constitutes a material change. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 8-14, 2930.) That contention is based in large part on select portions of the testimony of State
Farm representative Tammy Chase, which Plaintiff relies upon in an attempt to show that
the rating process of a policy is a part of the underwriting process. (See id.) However,
when Ms. Chase's testimony on this subject is viewed in its entirely, it is clear that
underwriting and pricing are two separate processes. (R. at 68, 70-71). Indeed, when
asked directly whether the rating of a vehicle was a part of the underwriting process, Ms.
Chase indicated that "[tjhere are two separate functions. Underwriting eligibility and
then rating. They're two separate functions." (R. at 70). She also clearly testified that
"underwriting has nothing to do with setting a premium amount" (R. at 71), and that a
change in vehicles changes the pricing of the risk, but not necessarily the underwriting.
(R. at 68). And although Ms. Chase did indicate that a material change could potentially
impact pricing, at no point did she state that any change in pricing was material. (R. at
254-55).
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More importantly, the courts have held that an increase in premiums does not
equate to a material change because such an increase does not change the nature of the
risk assumed by the insurer. See Johnson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16049, at *21; see also
Gasch, 808 So.2d at 1262 (increased premium, which accompanied the replacement of a
vehicle under the policy, did not create a new policy because the increase was not
associated with a change in coverage). Therefore, even though the Iversons premium
was increased when the PT Cruiser was substituted for the previous vehicle (R. at 116,
119), that increase did not convert the Iversons' existing policy into a new policy.
2. Periodic updates to a standard policy form do not create a new
policy.
In August 2001, State Farm updated its policy form. (R. 304). Such an update
does not create a new policy. See Wells, 185 N.W.2d at 149-50 (finding that an update in
a policy form did not create a new policy). It is common practice in the insurance
industry for carriers to make periodic updates to their policy forms. Such updates are
often made to clarify policy provisions or bring the policy in compliance with statutory
amendments.

Indeed, the Conditions section of the Iversons' Policy specifically

contemplates that revisions to the Policy would be made over time. (R. at 374).
Plaintiff has put forth great effort to find differences between State Farm's pre2001 policy form (the "previous form") and the form that was put into place in August
2001 (the "subsequent form"). (See Plaintiffs Brief at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims that those
differences have narrowed the coverages and substantially altered the Policy's terms.
(See id. at 5.) Such was not the case, as set forth more fully below.
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However, even if the changes could be construed as material, they did not convert
the Iversons' existing policy into a new policy subsequent to January 1, 2001 because
those changes were incorporated into the Policy by endorsement prior to that date. The
subsequent form merely combined those changes with the remainder of the Policy. The
adaptations pertaining to the bodily injury definition, motorcycle no-fault coverage, and
the newly acquired car definition were originally set forth in Endorsement 6126FA.
(Attached as part of Addendum "C".)3 Endorsement 6126FA was made effective August
28, 2000. (R. at 103). The distinction with regard to the rental of business vehicles was
originally established by way of Endorsement 6082P. (Attached as part of Addendum
"C".) That Endorsement was effective with the March 30, 1994 policy period. (See
Declarations Page, Attached as part of Addendum "C".)4 As such, the primary changes
relied upon by Plaintiff were made prior to January 1, 2001 and therefore could not have
created a new policy subsequent to that date.
Furthermore, the differences cited are no more than minor variations, made for
clarification purposes, or semantics. For instance, Plaintiff claims the subsequent form
alters the definition of "bodily injury" by eliminating coverage for emotional distress
which is unaccompanied by "physical bodily injury." (See id. at 5-6.) That definition
merely offers further clarification of the definition set forth in the previous form, which

3

Endorsement 6126FA was not made part of the current record because Plaintiffs policy
form argument was not raised in the underlying proceedings. However, it is the subject
of State Farm's Motion to Supplement Record, filed concurrently herewith.
4
Endorsement 6082P and the March 30, 1994 Declarations Page are also subjects of
State Farm's Motion to Supplement Record.
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specifies that there is no coverage for "sickness" unless such sickness is attached to a
bodily injury. (R. at 356).
Plaintiff contends that the subsequent form also "redefin[es] the nature of
coverage for rental vehicles" by excluding liability coverage for such vehicles when they
are used in connection with an insured's business or employment. (See Plaintiffs Brief
at 6.) However, under the previous form, coverage for a non-owned vehicle such as a
business rental was only provided when that vehicle was rented or in the possession of
the insured for less than twenty-one consecutive days. (R. at 356). Furthermore, such
coverage was only available in excess of other liability coverage available on that
vehicle. (R. at 361). Under then-existing Utah law, a rental company was obligated to
provide renters with primary coverage meeting the requirements of Utah's financial
responsibility laws, unless other valid or collectible insurance applied. See Utah Code
Ann. §31A-22-314(l)(1999). Therefore, the only difference between the two forms with
regard to coverage for rental vehicles was that under the previous form, excess coverage
was provided for the short-term rental of a business vehicle, while under the subsequent
form that coverage is not available.
Plaintiff also argues that the subsequent form removes no-fault coverage for the
occupation of a motorcycle. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.) However, under the previous
form, the Iversons would not have had no-fault coverage for the operation of any
motorcycle owned by them or a relative because no such vehicle was listed as insured
under the policy. (R. at 363). As such, the only situation in which the Iversons would
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have received no-fault motorcycle coverage under the previous form is one in which they
were operating a motorcycle which happened to belong to someone other than themselves
or a relative.
And in some situations, the differences between the two forms relied upon by
Plaintiff make no changes whatsoever. For instance, Plaintiff argues that the subsequent
form eliminates the ability of an insured to recover attorney fees when they elect to
arbitrate a dispute over no-fault benefits.

(See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.) However, as

recognized by Plaintiff, the previous form did not contain any language with regard to
attorney fees in arbitration disputes. (R. at 363). Under Utah law, a party is only entitled
to attorney fees in a contract claim if such fees are specifically permitted by contract or
statute. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, p o , 84 P.3d 1154.
Therefore, the subsequent form did not remove any right that existed under the previous
form with regard to attorney fees.
Plaintiff also contends that the subsequent form gives State Farm the "right to rely
on mailing as sufficient proof of notice" of cancellation. (See Plaintiffs Brief at 6.)
However, that same right was set forth under the previous form. (R. at 375). And finally,
Plaintiff contends that the subsequent form is materially different from the previous form
in that it now requires an insured to "ask" for coverage on a "newly acquired car" as
opposed to "tell[ing]" State Farm about such a car.

(See Plaintiffs Brief at 6-7.)

Although there is a technical distinction between "asking" someone to do something and
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"telling" them to do something, the exchange of those two words does nothing to alter an
insured's ability to obtain coverage on a "newly acquired car."
Plaintiff has offered no case law which would suggest that any of the above minor
changes to the policy form would be considered material. As discussed in Kaneshiro,
"the determinant question is whether the change in the policy is material to the initial
selection or waiver of [UIM] coverage . . .." See Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d at 500 (quoting
Lewis, 694 So. 2d at 577). The changes set forth by Plaintiff certainly would not have
caused the Iversons to rethink their selection of UIM coverage, nor could those changes
be said to significantly affect the legal relationship between State Farm and the Iversons.
The Iversons' Policy anticipated that some changes would be made to the policy
form over the life of the policy, and specified that such changes would not create a new
policy. (R. at 374). As set forth above, none of those changes altered the Policy in any
material way. Therefore, as was the case in Wells, the mere existence of a new policy
form does not create a new policy.
3. An isolated phrase found on a declarations page or changes in the
policy number's lettering do not convert an existing policy into a
new policy.
Plaintiff argues that a declarations page issued by State Farm includes a sentence
indicating that the page "[Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (See Plaintiffs Brief
at 15-18.) However, this phrase does not represent the establishment of a new policy.
Rather, it refers to the replacement of the policy change code letter from an "E" to an
"F". (R. at 259). Change codes are used to identify which declarations are in effect and
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to track changes in an existing policy such as a change in vehicle or a change to the
named insured. (R. at 294-95).
It is ironic that Plaintiff contends State Farm's use of the word "replaced" operates
to convert the policy into a new policy, and yet at the same time argues that State Farm
should not have the "power to wholly dictate the characterization of its insurance without
deference to the legislative requirements or the undisputed facts." (See Plaintiffs Brief
at 17.) State Farm agrees that the Policy's status should be determined in light of the
legal and factual issues set forth above, and that its use of a single word amongst
numerous pages of policy documents does nothing to alter that status.
Relatedly, slight variations to the lettering of the Iversons' policy number also do
not indicate that a new policy was issued. The single-digit letter codes on the end of the
Iversons' base policy number changed on two occasions subsequent to January 1, 2001.
(R. at 111, 119, 304). As indicated above, these changes codes are used to track which
declarations page is in effect under the Policy. (R. at 294-95). However, the testimony
on the record is that the base policy number associated with the Policy, 479 7848, has
remained the same throughout the life of the Policy. (R. at 70, 137-38, 295).
Furthermore, even if the policy number had changed, such a change, standing on
its own, is insufficient to create a new policy. See ej*. Chatlas, 892 N.E.2d at 110. Once
again, to allow an insurer to dictate the characterization of a statute simply by changing a
letter at the end of a policy number would cause great concern to insureds everywhere,
who benefit greatly from the continuance of an existing policy.
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In light of the above, it is clear that there was no material change made to the
Iversons' policy on or after January 1, 2001. There was no change in coverage limits, no
new application, no addition of a vehicle, or no other significant action during that time
period which impacted the risk assumed by State Farm under the Iversons' policy. As
such, there was no new policy written for the Iversons on or after January 1, 2001, and
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(b) therefore do not apply.
C. State Farm complied with the requirements set forth under § 31A22-305(9)(g), pertaining to policies in existence on January 1, 2001,
by sending the Iversons numerous renewal notices which informed
them of their options with regard to UIM coverage.
Inasmuch as the Iversons' State Farm policy was in existence prior to January 1,
2001, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g)(i) governs. As set forth below, State Farm
went above and beyond the requirements set forth under that statute.
For policies existing prior to January 1, 2001, an insurer was required to include in
its first two renewal notices sent after that date "an explanation of the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage . . .
." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(g)(i). See also Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, 1f22
(recognizing that the statute only requires "that a notice be sent to existing policyholders
informing them of the opportunity to purchase additional [UIM] coverage .. ..").
On January 1, 2001, the Iversons' Policy had UIM limits of $10,000 per person
and $20,000 per accident. (R. at 103). For the first two policy periods after that date,
State Farm sent the Iversons renewal notices which included the following language:
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Please read the enclosed insert titled IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES.
If you want to increase your [UM or UIM] limits to equal your Bodily Injury
Liability Coverage limits or $250,000/$500,000 (whichever is less), please contact
your agent.
(R. at 105, 108). In the insert included along with the renewal notice, State Farm
included the following information:
Utah law requires that auto policyholders carry Uninsured Motor Vehicle
(Coverage U) and Underinsured Motor Vehicle (Coverage W) with limits equal to
the lesser of:
1. the policyholder's Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits, or
2. $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
However, you may, in writing, reject either Coverage U or Coverage W or select
lower limits for either or both of these coverages.
Coverage U provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has
no liability insurance to compensate you for your bodily injuries.
Coverage W provides protection to you and others in your motor vehicle if there is
an accident caused primarily by the fault of another party and the other party has
liability insurance, but not enough to compensate for your bodily injuries.
Your Bodily Injury Liability Coverage, Coverage U, and Coverage W limits are
shown on your enclosed renewal notice. Following are the Coverage U and W
limits available and the applicable premium for each.
(R. at 145-46).

The insert proceeded to list various UM/UIM limits and the

corresponding premiums for each. It also notified the Iversons that in order to increase
their limits they should contact their agent, otherwise, the limits would remain the same.
(R. at 145-46).
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State Farm has verified that the above insert was included along with the February
27, 2001 and August 27, 2001 renewal notices. (R. at 72). Those notices clearly explain
"the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing
the coverage . . .." See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9)(g)(i). Furthermore, State Farm
went beyond the statutory mandate by including the same notice and inserts in three
additional renewals. (R. at 73, 121, 123, 126). As such, State Farm has clearly complied
with the requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(g)(i).
D. The legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(9) has
been met in this instance because the Iversons were well-informed
of the purposes and costs associated with various levels of UIM
coverage.
The purpose of the 2000 amendments to Section 31 A-22-305(9) was to ensure that
consumers possessed adequate information about the options at their disposal with regard
to UM and UIM coverage. See Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, Tjll. The statute was not
intended to mandate a certain level of UM/UIM coverage for consumers, but to simply
make them aware that greater levels of coverage may be available under their policies.
See id. Those purposes have clearly been met in this instance.
On five occasions, between February 27, 2001 and February 27, 2005, State Farm
explained to the Iversons the protections which were afforded by UIM coverage. (R. at
105, 108, 121, 123, 126, 145-46). On each of those occasions, they were told that they
could purchase UIM coverage equal to their liability limits if they so desired. (R. at 105,
108, 121, 123, 126, 145-46). Furthermore, they were made aware of the costs associated
with those coverages and were told that if they took no action, their limits would remain
27

at their current levels. (R. at 145-46). And even on several occasions prior to 2001, State
Farm had informed the Iversons of the purpose of UM/UIM coverage and offered them
the opportunity to purchase it in higher amounts. (R. at 131-33). This is not a case of an
insurer attempting to shirk its duties or to get away with providing a lesser coverage than
it was obligated. It is clear that State Farm went to great lengths to comply with its
statutory duty by ensuring that the Iversons were properly informed. The Iversons made
an informed decision not to purchase UIM coverage in greater amounts, and such
coverage should therefore not be mandated.
Furthermore, to hold that a new policy is created every time a vehicle or booklet is
changed under a policy would have an unintended and detrimental impact on insureds
and insurers alike. First, insureds would lose those benefits associated with a continuous
policy. For instance, every time a new policy is created, an insured must meet new
underwriting eligibility guidelines, and time accrued toward accident-free or similar
discounts would be lost. (R. at 70, 75). Plaintiff points out that a new policy might not
always cost more than a renewal. (Plaintiffs Brief at 9.) While it is true that insureds
may not always receive such benefits from a continuing policy, it is certain that they will
never receive those benefits under a new policy. For instance, in order to receive an
accident-free discount a policy must remain in force and accident-free for at least three
years. (R. at 106). The longer the policy remains in force and accident-free, the greater
the discount. (R. at 106). The Iversons benefited from such a discount for a number of
years. (R. at 105-26).
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Additionally, there are several disadvantages from a practical standpoint. If the
replacement of a vehicle created a new policy, an insured would need to go through the
application process every time they purchased a new vehicle. (R. at 70, 75). As such,
they would be unable to drive away from the dealership knowing they were covered, as
they can currently. And they would be required to expend the time and hassle of dealing
with the paperwork, including the UM/UIM election/waiver form, every time a vehicle is
replaced, a policy form is updated, a new policy number is issued, or a premium is
increased. The legislature certainly did not intend such a result.
As set forth above, State Farm has complied with the technical requirements of
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) and has fulfilled the legislature's intent behind that
statute. The Iversons knowingly opted to maintain UIM coverage at a level lower than
their bodily injury limits, and that decision should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should answer the certified question by finding
that the lower limits of underinsured motorist coverage set forth under the Iversons'
Policy were in compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b) and 31A-22305(9)(g) because that Policy was in existence prior to January 1, 2001.
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OPINION
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judg-
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ment may be cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Or. R. 36.3.
This case arises out of a dispute over insurance policies issued by Life Investors Insurance Company of
America (Life Investors), and Monumental Life Insurance Company (Monumental) in favor of Marvin Johnson, deceased. Life Investors and Monumental [*3]
appeal the order of the district court granting summary
judgment in favor of LaJuan Johnson and Steven Johnson, the plaintiffs and beneficiaries of insurance policies
issued by the two insurance companies. LaJuan and Steven Johnson (the Johnsons) cross-appeal the denial of
attorney fees. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the Johnsons in their case against Monumental, affirm the denial of attorney fees to the Johnsons
from Monumental, and reverse and remand the grant of
summary judgment against Life Investors, and denial of
attorney fees to the Johnsons from Life Investors, to the
district court for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For the purpose of ruling on the summary judgment
motions, the district court relied on the following undisputed material facts. In February 1989, Mr. Johnson
bought an accidental death policy from American Express Life Assurance Company (AMEX). In December
1989, Mr. Johnson and his wife, LaJuan Johnson, completed a "request for increased benefits" form in response
to a request they received from AMEX. In February [*4]
1993, Life Investors assumed responsibility for the insurance policy issued by AMEX to Mr. Johnson. Also in
1993, Mr. Johnson purchased a policy for accidental
death insurance from Monumental, designating his wife,
LaJuan, and his son, Steven, as beneficiaries.
Years prior to his purchase of these policies, Mr.
Johnson had been diagnosed with myotonic dystrophy, a
form of muscular dystrophy. He received treatment for
this disease until his death in 1995. Mr. Johnson developed muscle weakness as a result of the myotonic dystrophy. Although he remained relatively active, Mr.
Johnson did occasionally stumble and fall down. In
1991, Mr. Johnson fell down the stairs in his home and
received treatment in the hospital for his injuries.
On July 29, 1995, Mr. Johnson stumbled and fell
while carrying a tray up the stairs in his home, causing a
cervical neck fracture and a possible thoracic rib fracture.
Mr. Johnson was admitted to the hospital in the early
morning hours of July 30, 1995 and was treated for his
injuries. On August 1, 1995, while still in the hospital,
Mr. Johnson began to experience symptoms of pneumonia. His doctor transferred him to the care of a pulmo-

nologist in the intensive [*5] care unit. Because Mr.
Johnson began experiencing difficulty breathing, physicians attempted to intubate him to clear his lungs. However, this proved extremely difficult due to his neck
fracture. During the next day, it became apparent Mr.
Johnson could no longer breathe on his own and would
survive only with the assistance of long-term ventilatory
support. On August 2, 1995, authorized hospital staff
withdrew artificial life support measures and Mr. Johnson passed away. Dr. Edward Campbell filled out the
death certificate and listed the immediate cause of death
as pneumonia, due to or as a consequence of a cervical
spine fracture, and the underlying cause of death as
myotonic dystrophy. He identified the manner of death
as an "Accident."
Mrs. Johnson and Steven Johnson made claims under the insurance policies following Mr. Johnson's death.
Both insurance companies denied these claims, relying
on language in their policies excluding death caused by
sickness and defining an "injury" as a bodily injury
caused by an accident "independent of all other causes." '
1
The relevant language in the Monumental
policy is as follows:
DEFINITIONS

INJURY means bodily injury
caused by an accident. The accident must occur while the Covered
Person's insurance is in force under the Group Policy. The Injury
must be the direct cause of the
Loss and must be independent of
all other causes. The Injury must
not be caused by or contributed to
by Sickness.

EXCLUSIONS
We will not pay a benefit for
a loss which is caused by, results
from, or [is] contributed to by:

(5) Sickness or its medical or
surgical treatment, including diagnosis ....

The pertinent language from the Life Investors/AMEX policy is as follows:
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Definitions

"Injury" means bodily injury
of a Covered Person which:
1. is caused by an accident
which occurs when the Covered
Person's insurance is in force under the Policy; and
2. results in loss insured by
the Policy; and
3. creates loss due, directly
and independently of all other
causes, to such accidental bodily
injury.

General Exclusions
The Policy does not insure for
any loss resulting from any Injury
caused or contributed to by, or as a
consequence of...

3. any sickness or infirmity
unless the treatment of such is required as the direct result of an accidental bodily injury....

[*6] II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following the insurance companies' denial of coverage, the Johnsons filed suit in the district court, claiming the companies breached their contracts. However,
rather than making a determination on whether the companies breached the contracts, the district court instead
concluded the companies were estopped from relying on
the sickness exclusions to deny coverage because the
companies failed to disclose the sickness exclusions in
the manner required by Utah insurance regulations.
Consequently, the district court granted the Johnsons'
motions for summary judgment in both cases, and denied
the companies' cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court also denied the Johnsons' request for
attorney fees.
Monumental and Life Investors now appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Johnsons
and denial of their motions for summary judgment. Neither company denies it failed to disclose the sickness
exclusion in the manner required by the regulation. 2 Instead, each argues the regulation is inapplicable to its

policy. Monumental contends the disclosure obligations
do not apply to accidental death policies. Life Investors
concedes the [*7] disclosure regulation applies to accidental death policies but contends the regulation is inapplicable to its policy because Utah adopted the rule after
AMEX issued the original policy to Mr. Johnson. Both
companies argue they are entitled to summary judgment
because the Johnsons failed to show Mr. Johnson's death
resulted from an accident and independently of all other
causes. The Johnsons cross-appeal the denial of their
request for attorney fees.
2 The district court determined the language of
the exclusionary provisions is buried in each policy and not in bold or color typeface as required
by Utah's regulations. The court also concluded
the exclusions do not clearly inform laymen as to
what coverage exists.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT TO THE POLICIES
A. Standard of Review
Because the district court's jurisdiction over this
matter was based on diversity of citizenship, it was required to discern and apply the substantive law of Utah,
the forum state, with the objective of reaching [*8] the
same result as would a Utah court. See Brodie v. General
Chem. Corp., 112 F3d 440, 442 (10th Cir. 1997). We
review de novo the district court's determinations of the
substantive law of Utah. See id. However, although the
substantive law of Utah governs the analysis of the underlying claim in this case, federal law controls the ultimate procedural question - whether summary judgment
is appropriate. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d
782, 792 (10th Cir. 1997); May v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1996). "We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as did the district court. Summary
judgment is then appropriate if, after reviewing all of the
evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, no genuine issue of material fact survives to
merit a trial." Chambers v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 205 F3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Where, as here, the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, we are
entitled to assume that no evidence needs to be considered other than that filed [*9] by the parties, but summary judgment is nevertheless inappropriate if disputes
remain as to material facts." James Barlow Family Ltd.
Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 132 F.3d 1316,
1319 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1048, 140
L. Ed. 2d 513, 118 S. Ct. 1364 (1998). "Where different
ultimate inferences may properly be drawn, the case is
not one for a summary judgment." Seamons v. Snow, 206
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F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
B. Monumental
We first address Monumental's argument the Utah
disclosure regulation does not apply to its accidental
death policy. The regulation at issue is found in the portion of the Utah Administrative Code dealing with insurance administration, and entitled "Individual and
Franchise Disability Insurance, Minimum Standards."
Utah Admin. Code R590-126. The disclosure regulation
provides:
Accident-Only Disclosure. All accident-only policies shall contain a prominent statement on the first page of the
policy, or attached thereto, in either contrasting color or in boldface type at least
equal to the size of type used for policy
captions, as follows: [*10] "This is an
accident-only policy, and it does not pay
benefits for loss from sickness."

Utah Admin. CodeR590-126-6G. The scope of Rule 590
is described as follows:
This rule shall apply to all individual
and franchise disability insurance policies
.... The rule shall apply only to coverage
issued after the effective date of the rule.

Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2B (emphasis added). Rule
590 provides a list of definitions "in addition to the definitions of Sections 31A-1-301 and 31A-22-605(2),
U.C.A. [the general provisions of the Utah Insurance
Code]," which are to "apply for the purposes of this
rule." Utah Admin. Code R590-126-3A. The term "disability insurance" is defined in the general provisions of
the Utah Insurance Code as:
insurance written to indemnify for
losses and expenses resulting from accident or sickness, to provide payments to
replace income lost from accident or
sickness, and to pay for services resulting
directly from accident or sickness, including medical, surgical, hospital, and
other ancillary expenses.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(26) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). Monumental contends the term "disability
insurance" [*11] as defined above, is too narrow to encompass an accidental death policy, and thereby argues
the disclosure requirement contained in the regulation

section entitled "disability insurance," does not apply to
its policy.
The Utah courts have never determined whether the
rules set forth in the "Individual and Franchise Disability
Insurance" section of the insurance code apply only to
disability insurance policies or to other types of insurance policies such as those addressing accidental death
insurance. However, the general provisions of the Utah
Insurance Code define "disability insurance" broadly to
include insurance policies covering "losses" resulting
from accident or sickness. See Utah Code Ann. §
31A-1-301(26). Nothing in the regulations indicates that
"losses" resulting from accident or sickness do not include death. Moreover, as the district court noted, the
regulations dealing with "disability insurance" specifically mention policies providing for accidental death
benefits in several subsections. 3 Thus, it is clear Utah
implemented the "disability insurance" regulations with
the intent to cover accidental death policies. Even though
these regulations are not codified, [*12] in Utah, insurance regulations "passed pursuant to a statutory grant
of authority have the full force and effect of law." Horton
v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 842 P.2d 928, 932 n. 2
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); see also V-l Oil
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 904 P.2d 214,
218-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Consequently, we conclude the mandatory disclosure provision contained in
section R590-126-6G of the Utah Administrative Code
applies to Monumental's accidental death policy.
3 For example, the subsection entitled "Disability, Minimum Standards for Benefits," defines
and sets the minimum standards for "Accident-Only Coverage" as follows:
a policy of accident insurance
which provides coverage, singly or
in combination, for death, dismemberment, disability, or hospital and medical care caused by accident. Accidental death and
double dismemberment amounts
under such a policy shall be at
least $ 1,000 and a single dismemberment amount shall be at
least $ 500.

Utah Admin. Code R590-126-7H (emphasis
added). Likewise, "Specified Accident Coverage"
is defined as:
an accident insurance policy
which provides coverage for a
specifically identified kind of accident (or accidents) for each per-
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trict court correctly determined its definition was
more restrictive than allowed by Utah insurance
regulations, the proper remedy would have been
to substitute the statutory definition of "injury"
provided
in
Utah
Admin.
Code
R590-126-3A(l)(a). Monumental further argues
even if the district court substituted the less restrictive language to define injury under the contract, it still would not have been required to pay
death benefits to the Johnsons. We disagree.

son insured under the policy for
accidental death or accidental
death and dismemberment, combined with a benefit amount not
less than $ 1,000 for accidental
death, $ 1,000 for double dismemberment and $ 500 for single
dismemberment.

Utah Admin. Code R590-126-7I(1) (emphasis
added).
[*13]
Because Monumental's policy did not
comply with the disclosure regulation when issued, we
also conclude the district court applied the appropriate
remedy by striking the exclusionary language of the policy. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez,
668 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1983) (holding the insurance
company was estopped as a matter of law from denying
coverage under its policy due to its failure to comply
with Utah insurance law). 4 See also Cullum v. Farmers
Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922, 926-27 (Utah 1993) (concluding failure to comply with Utah insurance law rendered
an exclusion provision in the insurance contract unenforceable). 5 As a result, under the circumstances presented, Monumental's claim Mr. Johnson's myotonic
dystrophy caused or contributed to the fall which led to
his death is irrelevant to our determination.6 Because no
material, controverted facts are left for a jury to decide in
Monumental's case, the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of the Johnsons.
4 We reject Monumental's argument Martinez
cannot apply because it involved an insurance
company's failure to comply with Utah codified
law as opposed to mere insurance regulations. In
support of its argument, Monumental also contends estoppel cannot apply to violation of an
agency rule which it claims prohibits private relief. Contrary to these contentions, nothing in
Utah's insurance regulations prohibits private relief. Given Utah's insurance regulations maintain
the full force and effect of law, Horton, 842 P.2d
at 932 n.2, we see no difference in whether Monumental violated codified or regulatory provisions. As a consequence, it follows that if the
private remedy of estoppel is available for one, it
is also available for the other.
[*14]

The purpose of the disclosure regulation is to
alert the insured to the sickness exclusion. See
Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2A. It is nonsensical to assert the insurer may violate the disclosure regulation and be estopped from relying on
the sickness exclusion, but then allow the insurer
to nevertheless deny coverage based on other
language in the policy which effectively excludes
injuries allegedly resulting, in part, from sickness.
Thus, we reject Monumental's argument it is entitled to summary judgment because myotonic
dystrophy contributed to Mr. Johnson's death.
[*15]
6 Despite Monumental's contentions, the district court's ruling did not turn the policy into a
"disability" or "life insurance" policy. Rather, the
district court recognized the policy extended only
accidental death insurance, but under the circumstances, extended such coverage without determining if an underlying illness caused the "accident," given the policy's failure to follow Utah's
disclosure requirements. While Monumental argues the district court should have applied the
exclusion and denied benefits under our holding
in Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of
America, 975 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1992), it
misses the point. First, the district court never
reached the issue on whether Winchester applied
to this case given Monumental's failure to comply
with Utah's disclosure requirements. Consequently, even if we determined the exclusion
adequately discloses that coverage does not extend to accidents resulting from pre-existing conditions, Monumental nevertheless violated Utah's
disclosure regulations by burying the disclosure
in the policy and not setting it out in bold or colored type.
[* 16] D. Life Investors

5 Monumental argues the district court erred by
striking the language defining "injury" in its policy. Monumental argues the district court acted
overzealously by striking this language as a consequence of its violating the disclosure regulation. Monumental also contends even if the dis-

Life Investors asserts the disclosure regulation does
not apply to its policy because AMEX issued the original
policy before the disclosure regulation became effective.
7
The district court concluded Life Investors/AMEX subjected itself to the provisions of the regulation by ac-
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cepting additional premiums for increased benefits after
the effective date of the disclosure rule. 8 Life Investors
argues the district court made this determination in error,
and suggests the subsequent agreement did not constitute
the formation of a wholly new contract that brought it
under the auspices of the mandatory disclosure regulation.
7 As stated previously, Mr. Johnson bought the
accidental death policy from AMEX in February
1989. Utah enacted the Regulations at issue on
June 20, 1989. Mr. Johnson increased his benefits
in December 1989. In February 1993, Life Investors assumed responsibility for the AMEX insurance policy.
8 Life Investors points out the district court relied on the wrong certificate when rendering its
decision. This mistake arose from the confusion
generated when, during discovery, Life Investors
mistakenly produced a copy of a specimen certificate which it did not send to the Johnsons.
However, Life Investors drew the court's attention to this error in a motion to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted
Life Investors' motion, and Life Investors subsequently filed a supplemental memorandum in
support of its motion for summary judgment and
attached the correct certificate. Although Life
Investors maintains the district court committed
plain error by relying on the incorrect certificate
in rendering its decision, it contends the court
would have reached the same decision even if it
relied on the correct certificate, and asks us to review the district court's decision as if it relied on
the correct certificate. The district court reasoned
the definition of a "covered injury" contained on
page five of the wrong certificate acted as an exclusion for sickness and struck the provision because it lacked bold-faced or colored type as required by the disclosure regulation. We agree the
reasoning of the district court concerning the applicability of the disclosure regulation to Life Investors' policy would have been the same whether
it relied on the correct or incorrect certificate, and
thus, in the interest of resolving this dispute, we
review the district court's decision as if based on
the correct certificate.
[•17]
Under Utah law, substantive statutes affecting
vested rights do not apply retroactively. See Olsen v.
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah
1998). However, because the Utah courts have never
addressed whether an agreement to increase benefits in a

life insurance contract creates a new policy, subject to
statutes and regulations enacted after issuance of the
original policy, we look to "other state court decisions,
federal decisions, and the general weight and trend of
authority" to determine how the Utah courts would resolve this issue. May, 84 F.3d at 1345 (quotation marks
and citations omitted). Other courts, analyzing similar
issues, have held an increase in premiums, benefits, or
coverage, does not constitute the creation of a new certificate of insurance subject to regulations enacted after
the original date the policy became effective. See, e.g.,
Gahn v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 926 F.2d 1449, 1456 (5th
Cir. 1991) (applying Louisiana law and holding the
modification of the terms of an insurance policy does not
create a new policy); Metropolitan Property and Liability Ins. Co. v. Gray, 446 So. 2d 216, 219-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) [* 18] (holding the mere addition of another
person on a policy does not amount to a reissuance of the
policy and thus, does not make the policy subject to statutes effective after the issuance of the original policy);
Crow v. Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co., 119 N.M. 452,
891 P.2d 1206, 1211 (N.M. 1995) (construing the insurance policy and rider as part of same contract for insurance); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 15
A.D.2d242, 222N.Y.S.2d339, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961)
(determining a rider attached to the face of a policy containing an option for extended benefits on the payment of
additional premium merely amounts to an extended privilege and does not create a new policy); Hidary v.
Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 155 Misc. 2d 993, 591 N.Y.S2d
706, 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding increases in face
amount of coverage for payment of additional premiums
did not constitute separate new policies); French v. Insurance Co. ofN Am., 591 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (reasoning the addition of a car to insurance policy did not create a new policy subject to a
statute which became effective after the issuance [*19]
of the original policy). We can see no reason why Utah
would depart from the majority view on this point of law.
Nevertheless, we turn to the Johnsons' argument the increase in benefits amounted to new "coverage" and thus,
became subject to the disclosure regulation.
In support of their argument Life Investors became
subject to the disclosure regulation when it accepted the
Johnsons' additional premium payment after the disclosure regulation became effective, the Johnsons focus on
the word "coverage" and point out the disability insurance rules "apply only to coverage issued after the effective date of the rule." Utah Admin. Code R590-126-2B
(emphasis added). In applying this provision to their
policy, the Johnsons point out AMEX sent them a letter
after it received the additional premium payment stating:
I have enclosed your revised Data Page
for your Certificate APG1000984 which
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reflects your increase in coverage. Please
replace the original Data Page with this
new one.
Your new quarterly premium will be
$ 82.32. A charge of $ 56.95 has been
placed on your American Express Card
account. This represents the difference in
premium due for your additional coverage. [*20]

(Emphasis added.) Based on this language, the Johnsons
maintain that by increasing the benefits under the policy,
AMEX issued new "coverage" after the effective date of
the disclosure regulation, making Life Investors subject
to the disclosure regulation. We disagree.
The term "coverage" when used in the context of an
insurance contract is widely held to mean "inclusion of a
risk under an insurance policy; the risks within the scope
of an insurance policy." Black's Law Dictionary 372 (7th
ed. 1999). See Traders State Bank v. Continental Ins.
Co., 448 F.2d 280, 283 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The word
coverage is, indeed, a term of art in the insurance industry, meaning the sum of all the risks assumed under the
policy.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 993 F.2d 313,
315 (2d Cir. 1993); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bayside
Resort, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (V.I. 1986); Illinois
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 267 III. App. 3d 245, 642
N.E.2d 159, 163, 204 III. Dec. 697 (III. App. Ct. 1994);
Delcampo v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 266 N.J. Super. 687, 630 A.2d 415, 422 (N.J Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); [*21] Farmers Ins. Co. of
Washington v. Fredericks on, 81 Wn. App. 319, 914 P.2d
138, 140 (Wash. Ct App. 1996). On the other hand, the
term "benefit" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:
"Financial assistance that is received from an employer,
insurance, or a public program (such as social security)
in time of sickness, disability, or unemployment."
Black's Law Dictionary 151 (7th. ed. 1999). See Vogelv.
Wells, 57 Ohio St. 3d 91, 566 NE.2d 154, 161 (Ohio
1991) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary to define "benefit"); Kratz v. Kratz, 905 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla. 1995)
(relying on Black's Law Dictionary to define "benefit" in
the context of an insurance contract).
Hence, neither definition persuades us an increase in
"benefits" alone increases the "coverage" or assumed
risks of an insurance contract, thereby creating a new or
different contract or policy. Under the circumstances
presented we conclude the increase in premiums and
benefits did not change the nature of the coverage or
create a new policy subject to the disclosure regulation
because it did not alter the type of risk Life Investors
assumed under the policy - it only altered the [*22]

amount of the benefits Life Investors was obligated to
pay in the event a legitimate claim arose under the policy. For these reasons, the district court erred by determining Life Investors was estopped as a matter of law
from refusing to honor the Johnson's claim. We therefore
remand to the district court for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion on the Johnsons' claims
against Life Investors, including their breach of contract
claim.9
9
The Johnsons contend they are entitled to
summary judgment even if the district court erred
by determining Life Investors was estopped from
relying on the sickness exclusion to deny coverage. In support, the Johnsons argue the majority
of jurisdictions, examining language in insurance
contracts similar to the exclusionary language
contained in their policy, refused to allow the insurance companies to rely on such language to
deny coverage unless the preexisting illness constituted the "predominant cause" of the injury, or
the preexisting illness "substantially contributed
to the loss." In response, Life Investors argues the
Utah Supreme Court would interpret the definition of "injury" in its policy to preclude coverage.
Relying on Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.
of America, 975 F2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1992), Life
Investors urges us to reverse the district court's
denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment
and rule the Johnsons are not entitled to coverage
under the policy as a matter of law because they
cannot prove Mr. Johnson's death resulted directly from an accident, independent of all other
causes. We leave the determination of this issue
to the district court on remand.
After filing their brief with this Court, the
Johnsons filed a motion for us to certify this issue
to the Utah Supreme Court, contending certification is proper because the Utah courts have not
yet determined "how, under state law, language
limiting coverage under accidental death policies
where an insured suffers a preexisting disease
should be interpreted ...." Life Investors filed no
response to the Johnsons' motion to certify, but in
its opposition to the Johnsons' motion for certification, Monumental argues this Court should interpret the "direct cause of loss, independent of
all other causes" language as allowing it to deny
coverage based on Winchester and without resorting to certification to the state court. We deny
the Motion for Certification without reaching its
merits, and decline addressing Monumental's motion in opposition, leaving the Johnsons free to
reassert their motion to certify in the district court
on remand.
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[*23] IV. ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE
Finally, we address the Johnsons' contention the district court erred by denying them attorney fees. In a diversity suit, the issue of attorney fees is considered a
substantive matter and is controlled by state law. Jones
v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 757 (10th Or.
2000). However, our standard of review is a matter of
federal law and "we review a district court's award of
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. The district court's
factual findings are only reversed if clearly erroneous.
Legal conclusions and statutory analysis are reviewed de
novo." Parks v. American Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889,
892 (10th Cir.1995) (citations omitted).
In Utah, the general rule is attorney fees are recoverable only if provided for in a contract at issue or by
statute. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr,
791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, exceptions to this general rule exist. In an insurance contract dispute where the insured sues the insurer for
breach of contract, attorney fees may be recovered as
consequential damages for either a breach of the express
terms of the contract or for a breach [*24] of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Billings v.
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996).
A. Breach of the Express Terms of the Contract
An insured may recover attorney fees as consequential damages for the breach of an express term in the insurance contract if the fees "were reasonably within the
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Billings, 918
P.2d at 468 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
in order to recover attorney fees as consequential damages flowing from a breach of express terms in the contracts, the Johnsons need to first show the companies
breached the contracts. However, the district court never
ruled on whether either company breached the express or
implied terms of its contract. The district court instead
found Monumental and Life Investors were estopped
from relying on the sickness exclusions in their policies,
and under the doctrine of estoppel, held the Johnsons
could not recover attorney fees.
Given our and the district court's holdings that Monumental is estopped from denying coverage, we must
examine the principles of estoppel [*25] to determine if
attorney fees from Monumental are warranted in this
case. To begin, estoppel does not operate to alter the
terms of the contract as originally written. See Perkins v.
Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1131
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Rather, estoppel is normally asserted as a defense to a claim or right and does not create
an independent cause of action. See Raymond v. Halifax

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 466 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N. W.2d 352,
357-58 (N.D. 1986); see also General Motors, 668 P.2d
at 502 ("Although estoppel is usually a factual defense, it
may be established as a matter of law to preclude an insurance company from relying on an exclusion in a credit
life and accident policy."). Estoppel merely abates the
insurer's right to defend against the insured's claim for
breach of contract by relying on the language in its policy. See id. Moreover, unlike breach of contract where the
award of attorney fees is reasonably contemplated at the
time of the contract, Billings, 918 P. 2d at 468, estoppel
is not an independent cause [*26] of action like breach
of contract, or a circumstance in which attorney fees are
ever contemplated. It is not the same as breach of contract for the purpose of awarding attorney fees.
In applying this conclusion to the facts of this case,
we note neither we nor the district court ever reached the
issue of whether Monumental breached its contract with
the Johnsons when holding Monumental is estopped as a
matter of law from relying on the sickness exclusion.
Therefore, the Johnsons are not entitled to attorney fees
from Monumental under the theory Monumental
breached the express terms of the contract. However,
because we are reversing and remanding the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Johnsons on their claim against Life Investors, we leave the
determinations of whether Life Investors breached the
express terms of its contract, and whether the Johnsons
are entitled to attorney fees under Utah law, to the district court.
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The Johnsons alternatively assert an award of attorney fees is proper because the companies breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 10 In
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
[*27] the Utah Supreme Court recognized attorney fees
may be available as consequential damages flowing from
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by an insurance company. Id. at 801. Under
Beck, an insurer may be found to breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it fails to diligently investigate the facts underlying a claim, fairly
evaluate the claim, or "act promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling the claim." Id. "The overriding requirement imposed by the implied covenant is that insurers act reasonably ... in dealing with their insureds."
Billings, 918 P. 2d at 465. However, "when an insured's
claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate
it and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id.
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10 The Johnsons assert because Life Investors
with Life Investors that the regulation does not apply to
did not answer their cross-appeal from the denial
its contract, we cannot hold Life Investors violated the
of attorney fees, it waived the issue. Although an
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by asserting it is
appellant who chooses not to brief an issue may
not estopped from relying on the sickness exclusion.
be deemed to waive the issue, see Sheets v. Salt
However, on remand, the Johnsons might prove Life
Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1390 (10th Cir.),
Investors breached the covenant of good faith and fair
cert, denied, 516 U.S. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 34, 116dealing on other grounds and that they are entitled [*29]
S. Ct. 74 (1995), this rule does not apply to apto attorney fees in accordance with Utah law.
pellees. The Johnsons, as the appellants, retain
the burden to prove on appeal the trial court
V. CONCLUSION
erred. If the insurance companies, as the appelFor the foregoing reasons, and applying the prinlees, choose not to defend the trial court's deciciples for reviewing summary judgment determinations,
sion, this does not relieve the Johnsons of their
we REVERSE the district court's order granting sumburden to convince us of the district court's ermary judgment to the Johnsons in their suit against Life
rors.
Investors, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As to the issue of attorney fees,
[*28] The Johnsons contend "as a matter of law,
we REVERSE and REMAND the district court's denial
the Companies could not have acted diligently, fairly or
of attorney fees to the Johnsons from Life Investors for
reasonably in rejecting the Johnsons' claims, as they vifurther proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
olated applicable Utah Insurance Department RegulaAFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment
tions by which they were bound, and denied the claims in
in favor of the Johnsons against Monumental and AFthe face of the Regulations." However, they cite no case
FIRM the denial of attorney fees to the Johnsons from
where failing to comply with insurance regulations has
Monumental.
been found to be the equivalent of failing to fairly evaluate a claim or act promptly and reasonably in rejecting
the claim. Nor are we persuaded by the Johnsons' arguEntered by the Court:
ment. Monumental's contention the disclosure regulation
did not apply to its contract is "fairly debatable" as the
WADE BRORBY
Utah courts have not ruled directly on the issue of
United States Circuit Judge
whether the disability insurance regulations apply to accidental death policies. Obviously, because we agree
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DISPOSITION:
Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment is therefore granted. Defendant's cross-motion
is denied.
COUNSEL: Beverly L. Bove, Esq., of Tomar, Simonoff, Adourian & O'Brien, for plaintiffs.
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JUDGES: [* 1] Before John E. Babiarz, Jr., Judge
OPINION BY: BABIARZ, JR.
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHNE. BABIARZ, JR., Judge
Plaintiffs Kathleen and Dan Matney have filed a motion
for summary judgment, asking this Court to declare as a
matter of law that they are entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage up to a single limit of $ 300,000. Defendant Nationwide Insurance
Company has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that its liability in this claim is limited to
$100,000.
The Matneys initially insured a vehicle with Nationwide in March, 1984, which provided liability coverage
in the amount of$ 25,000 per person, $ 50,000 per occurrence. UM coverage was in the same amounts. On
June 11, 1984, the Matneys renewed their policy, increasing their liability coverage to $ 300,000. They did
not increase the $ 25,000/50,000 limit on their UM coverage. At the time of that renewal, Mr. Matney executed

a "Form A" document, which is a coverage election form
required by Regulation No. 9 of the Insurance Commissioner l which contains general [*2]
information
about automobile insurance and also provides spaces
where the coverage selected by the insured is filled in.
The form contained the following language2:
1
The Insurance Commissioner is authorized
under 18 Del.C. § 314(a) to "make reasonable
rules and regulations necessary for or as an aid to
the administration or effectuation of any provision of this title.
2 The Form A issued by the Insurance Commissioner states that uninsured/underinsured vehicle coverage is available in limits "up to the
Bodily
Injury
Liability
Limits
or $
100,000/300,000 whichever is less." 'hat form,
which is included in Defendant's Exhibit "A",
was amended effective December 1, 1983. An
April 23, 1980 version of the form reflects the $
300,000/300,000 limits found on the Nationwide
form Mr. Matney signed on June 11, 1984.
Another revision occurred April 10, 1987.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage *
(Optional) (Available in limits up to the Bodily Injury Liability Limits or $ 300,000/300,000 whichever is
less)

* Uninsured Motorists Coverage is not mandatory
but it is required that the coverage be offered to all policyholders
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There is an issue of fact as to whether the [*3]
Matneys were informed of the cost of the varying
amounts of UM coverage available.
At the time the Form A was signed, the insurer was
required to offer the UM option with each material
change in the policy, which included adding a new vehicle to the policy. Arms v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Del. Super., 465 A.2d 360
(1983), offd Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 1060 (1984). On July
20, 1984, an amended version of 18 Del.C. § 3902 went
into effect which relieved insurance carriers of the burden of reoffering the UM option each time a vehicle is
added or substituted.
The Matneys subsequently had occasion to review
their policy on four occasions. In March, 1985, they
added a second car. The next month they renewed their
policy. In June they replaced one car with a newer model
and in September they did the same for their second car.
All of these events occurred after the amended version of
18 Del.C § 3902 went into effect, and no further Form A
documents were executed by the Matneys.
When it came time to renew the policy in September, 1986, Nationwide unilaterally raised the UM coverage on the Matney's vehicles to $ 100,000/300,000 split
limits. The $ 300,000 [*4] single limit liability insurance was unaffected by the change. Nationwide included
a "stuffer message" with the renewal which included the
following statements:
With the enclosed renewal billing we have either
added UMC coverage to your policy or increased your
present limit on each vehicle to equal your present Bodily Injury coverage limits or the maximum limit permitted
by Delaware law, whichever is less.
— The maximum Uninsured Motorists Bodily Injury
limit permitted by law is $ 100,000 per person, $ 300,000
per accident.
~ There will be no change in your present policy if
your Bodily Injury and UMC Bodily Injuy limits are
equal.
~ Higher limits of Bodily Injury and UMC Bodily
Injury coverage are available from your Nationwide
Agent.
You still have the option to select lower UMC Bodily Injury limits or reject UMC coverage.
If you have any questions concerning these changes
in your policy limits, we urge you to contact your Nationwide Agent.
The Matneys took no action to reject the change in
UM coverage. Mrs. Matney was subsequently injured in

an automobile accident on January 2, 1987, by an underinsured motorist.
The parties dispute whether Nationwide had a duty
to [*5] offer the Matneys the option of increasing their
UM limits when vehicles were added or substituted on
their policy. Nationwide argues that the new legislation
relieved them of that duty. The Matneys counter that
argument by asserting that the amendment to 18 Del.C §
3902(a) (1) was deemed not to apply retroactively to
policies and renewals coming before July 20, 1984.3
3 The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of
this argument, Whaley v. Allstate, D. Del, 595
F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (1984), and Ritter v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., D. Del, 633 F.Supp. 362, 367
(198b) concern accidents which occurred prior to
July 20, 1984, the effective date of the amendment, a situation markedly different from the case
at bar.
It is unnecessary to resolve that particular dispute
because, whether or not Nationwide was obliged to do
so, it did, in fact, make an offer in September, 1986, to
increase the UM coverage by way of the stuffer message
coupled with the increased UM coverage.
The Matneys accepted the offer by not requesting
that the lower limits be reinstated and by paying the
concomitant higher premiums. The effect of this acceptance was to alter the agreement reflected on Form [*6]
A.
Nationwide contends that the affirmative rejection of
the $ 300,000 single limit UM coverage reflected in
Form A is still operative today, notwithstanding the
change in coverage due to Nationwide's initiative. Section 3902(a)(1) reads as follows:
(1) No such coverage shall be required in or supplemental to a policy when rejected in writing, on a form
furnished by the insurer or group of affiliated insurers
describing the coverage being rejected, by an insured
named therein, or upon any renewal of such policy or
upon any reinstatement, substitution, amendment, alteration, modification, transfer or replacement thereof by the
same insurer unless the coverage is then requested in
writing by the named insured....
Ordinarily, once an insured rejects in writing UM
coverage he would otherwise be entitled to, he must
make a written request to obtain that coverage at a later
date 18 Del.C. § 3902(a)(1). No such request was made
here. However, the stuffer message which accompanied
the 1986 renewal contained a material misstatement of
the law.
Subsection (b) provides as follows:
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(b) Every insurer shall offer to the insured the option
to purchase additional coverage for personal [*7] injury or death up to a limit of $ 100,000 per person and $
300,000 per accident or $ 300,000 single limit, but not to
exceed the limits for bodily injury liability set forth in
the basic policy. Such additional insurance shall include
underinsured bodily injury liability coverage
This subsection requires that the insurer offer UM
coverage up to a $ 300,000 single limit to those insureds,
like the Matneys, who carry that amount in liability insurance. Kulas v. Nationwide, Del. Super., C.A. No.
87C-OC-87, Babiarz, J., (May 30, 1989).
Although the Form A Mr. Matney signed on June
11, 1984, makes reference to the availability of UM coverage up to $ 300,000/300,000, the stuffer message
misstates the law as follows: "The maximum Uninsured
Motorists Bodily Injury limit permitted by law is $
100,000 per person, $ 300,000 per accident." In fact,
Nationwide was obliged to offer the Matneys $ 300,000
single limit coverage, see Kulas, supra, and was permitted to offer even higher amounts. Nationwide in effect
represented that the amount of coverage that they were
now offering, which the Matneys accepted, was the
maximum allowable by law. The Matneys could reasonably have understood [*8] that the $ 300,000/300,000
coverage was no longer available.
There is a dispute over whether the insureds' decision in choosing UM coverage was informed. The dispute centers on whether a meaningful offer must include
information about the cost of such insurance. See Morris
v. Allstate, Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-OC-23 (Taylor,

Judge) (July 10, 1984). I do not need to reach that issue
because I find that the renewal offer made in this case
was misleading and therefore not meaningful. Because
Nationwide, at the time it induced the Matneys to reevaluate their UM coverage, suggested that $
300,000/300,000 limits were no longer available, there
was no clear rejection of those limits. Nationwide cannot
rely on the Form A rejection of the $ 300,000/300,000
limits for two reasons. First, Regulation 9, Article 9(e),
in effect when the form was signed, stated that the form
"will remain in effect until modified by the insurance."4
Since the Matneys have modified their UM coverage, it
follows that the form, at least insofar as UM coverage is
concerned, is no longer applicable. Second, the stuffer
message suggested that the $ 300,000 single limit was no
longer available as an option. Nationwide [*9] withdrew that option at a time when it induced the Matneys
to accept what was represented to be the maximum permitted by law. Thus a rejection of what was in fact the
maximum required to be offered, the $ 300,000 single
limit, is far from clear.
4 The provisions of article 9(e) are now found
in article 11. The above-cited language is no
longer incorporated into Regulation No. 9 See
Regulation No. 9, Art. 11(a), revised May 16,
1987 and December 31, 1987.
Failure to offer the required coverage serves to extend a continuing offer of such coverage. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arms, Del Supr., 477 A.2d 1060
(1984). Plaintiffs are now entitled to elect UM coverage
up to the $ 300,000 single limit.
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6126FA AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy
remain the same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a
different effective date is specified by us in writing
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that your policy is changed as follows:
1. DEFINED WORDS
day after the delivery of the
car to you or your spouse, or
a. The definition of bodily injury is changed
to read.
2. the effective date and time of
a policy issued by us or any
Bodily Injury - means physical bodily
other company that describes
injury to a person and sickness, disthe car on its declarations
ease or death which results from it. A
person does not sustain bodily injury
if that person suffers emotional disYou or your spouse may apply for a
tress in the absence of physical bodily
policy that will provide coverage beinjury.
yond the 30th day for the additional
car Such policy will be issued only if
b. The definition of newly acquired car is
both the applicant and the vehicle are
changed to read:
eligible for coverage at the time of
Newly Acquired Car - means a replaceapplication
ment car or an additional car.
If a newly acquired car is not otherwise
Replacement Car - means a car
afforded comprehensive or collision coverage by this or any other policy, this polnewly owned by or newly leased to
icy will provide the comprehensive or
you or your spouse that replaces your
collision coverage not otherwise provided
car. This policy will only provide
for the newly acquired car. If such covercoverage for the replacement car if
age is provided by this paragraph, it will
you or your spouse.
apply only umil 12 01 A.M. Standard
1 ask us to insure it within 30
Time at the address shown on the declarations page on the sixth day after the delivdays after its delivery to you
ery of the car to you or your spouse Any
oi your spouse, and
comprehensive or collision coverage pro2. pay us any added amount
vided by this paragraph is subject to a dedue.
ductible of5500
Additional Car - means an added car
c. The definition of relative is changed to
newly owned by or newly leased to
readyou or your spouse. This policy will
only provide coverage for the addiRelative - means a person related to
tional car if.
you or your spouse by blood, marriage, adoption or guardianship who
t. it is a private passenger car
resides with you, including those who
and we insure all other priusually make their home in your
vate passenger cars\ or
household but temporarily live else2. it is other than a private pas*
where
senger car and we insure all
d
The
definition of spouse is changed to
cars
read:
owned by or leased to you or your
Spouse - means vour husband or
spouse on the date of its delivery to
wife who resides with you.
you or your spouse
I — LIABILITY — COVERThis policy provides coverage for the 2. SECTION
AGE A
additional car only until the earlier of:
a. The third paragraph is changed to read
1 12-01 A.M Standard Time at
the address shown on the
In addition to the limits of liability, we
declarations page on the 31st
will pay for an insured any costs
6126FA
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listed below resulting from such accident.
L Court costs of any suit for
damages that we defend.
2. Interest on damages owed by
the insured due to a judgment and accruing:
a. after the judgment, and
until we pay, offer or deposit in court the amount
due under this coverage;
or
b. before the judgment,
where owed by law, and
until we pay, offer or deposit in court the amount
due under this coverage,
but only on mat part of
the judgment we pay.
3. Premiums or costs of bonds:
a. to secure the release of
sto tasurt&*s property
attached under a court
order;
b. required to appeal a decision in a suit for damages if we have not paid
our limit of liability that
applies to the suit; and
c. up to $250 for each bail
bond needed because of
an accident or related
traffic law violation.
We have no duty to furnish
or apply for any bonds. The
amount of any bond we pay
for shall not be more than our
limit of liability.
4.

Expenses incurred by an insured;
a. far loss of wages or salary up to $100 per day if
we ask the insured to
attend the trial of a civil
suit
b. for first aid to others at
the time of the accident.
c. at our request

>>. Ttot provision ti\\to liaSVtr Coverage »
changed to read:

Trailer Coverage
The HabWfy coverage extends to the ownership maintenance or use, by an insured,
of:
1 trailers designed to be pulled by a
private passenger car or a utility
vehicle, except those trailers in
2.a. below.
Farm implements and farm wagons are considered trailers while
pulled on public roads by a car
we insure For liability.
These trailers are not described in
the declarations and no extra
premium is charged.
2, the following trailers only if they
are described on the declarations
page and extra premium is paid:
a. trailers designed to be pulled
by a private passenger car or
a utility vehtcle:
(1) if designed to carry per-

wnrt\n

b.

(2) while used with a motor
vehicle whose use is
shown as ''commercial" on
the declarations pace
(trailers used only tot
pleasure use are covered
even if not described and
no extra premium paid); or
(3) while used as premises
for office, store or display purposes; or
trailers not designed to be
pulled by a private passenger
car or a utility vehicle.

When w* r c f c r *° trailer coverage, insured
means:
1. >*»''
2, jour spouse:
y the relatives of the first person
named in the declarations;
4, any other person while using
your car, a newh acquired car or
a temporary substitute car, if its
use is within the scope of consent
of you ox your spouse; and
5. any other person or organization
liable for the use of a covered
nailer "oy one ol tne £oove » *
sureds*
6126FA
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THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A
TRAILER IS USED WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS NOT COVERED UNDER
THE LIABUJIY COVERAGE OF THIS
POLICY.
c. The first paragraph of Limits of Liability
is changed to read:
Limits of Liability
The amount of bodily injury liability
coverage is shown on the declarations
page under "Limits of Liability Coverage A - Bodily Injury, Each
Person, Each Accident . Under "Each
Person" is the amount of coverage for
all damages due to bodily injury to
one person. "Bodily injury to one
person" includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, and all emotional distress
resulting from this bodily injury sustained by other persons who do not
sustain bodily injury. Under "Each
Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown
under "Each Person**, for all damages
due \o bodily injury lo two or more
persons in the same accident
d. Item 1 of If There b Other Liability
Coverage is changed to read:
1. Policies Issued by Us to You,
Your Spouse, or Any Relative
If two or more vehicle liability
policies issued by us to you, your
spouse, or any relative apply to
the same accident, the total limits
of liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the policy
with the highest limit of liability.
e. Item 3 of If There Is Other Liability
Coverage is changed to read:
3. Temporary Substitute Car,
Non-Owned Car, Trailer
Subject to items 1 and 2, if a rent*
porary substitute car, a nonowned car or a trailer designed
for use with a private passenger
car or utility vehicle:
a. has other vehicle liability
coverage on it; or
b. is self-insured under any
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, a motor carrier law or any similar law,
then this coverage is excess over
such insurance or self-insurance.

However, subject to items I and 2
above, this policy shall provide
primary coverage if:
a. the vehicle is owned by a car
business;
b. an insured h operating the
vehicle; and
c. the insured is neither a per*
son engaged in such car
business nor that person's
employee or agent
SECTION U — NO-FAULT — COVERAGE P
a. Item 2, Disability Benefits, of What We
Pay is changed to read:
2. Disability Benefits. This is reimbursement for
a, 85% of an insured's loss of;
(1) $tosi income; or
(2) earning capacity
due to that insureds inability to
work during a period that:
(1) begins when the loss of gross
income or earning capacity
begins; and
(2) ends either:
(a) when the insured no
longer has any loss of
gross income or earning
capacity;
(b) when the insured dies;
or
(c) 52 weeks after the loss,
whichever occurs first
This benefit is not paid for the
first three days of disability, unless the disability continues for
longer than two consecutive
weeks after the date of injury.
The most we will pay is the
amount shown in the Schedule for
your coverage symbol.
b. services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for
services the insured would have
performed for his or her household except for the injury. These
services must be performed during a period that:
\\} Y*$vra to* 4»y* *5\ti to
date of the injury; and
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(2) ends either:
(a) when the insured can
perform these services;
(b) when the insured dies;
or
(c) 365 days after the date
of the injury,
whichever occurs First
If the insured's disability continues
for more than 14 consecutive days
after the date of the injury, the period begins on the date of the injury.
The most we pay per day is $20.
b. Item 2 of the definition of Insured under
Definitions is changed to read:
2. any other person:
a, while occupying your car or
a newly acquired car with
the permission of:
0) you, your spouse, any
relative', or
(2) the person driving such
car with your permission; or
b. while a pedestrian, if injured
in an accident that occurs in
Utah and involves' your car
or a newly acquired car.
c. Item 4 of When Coverage P Does Not
Apply is changed to read:
4. WHILE OPERATING OR OCCUPYING A MOTORCYCLE;
d. The following is added to item 1, Deciding Amount, of the provision Settlement
orLoss:
An insured is not entitled to attorney
fees if the insured elects arbitration as
provided for by this policy.
SECTION m — UNINSURED MOTOR
VEHICLE — COVERAGE U AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE —
COVERAGE W
a. The second paragraph under UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U is changed to read:
We will pay damages for bodily injury
an insured is legally entitled to collect
from the owner or driver of an unut'
sured motor vehicle. The bodily injury
must be sustained by an insured and
caused by accident arising out of die

operation, maintenance or use of an
uninsured motor vehicle.
b» The first paragraph of the definition of
Uninsured Motor Vehicle is changed to
read:
Uninsured Motor Vehicle - means:
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance or use of which
is:
a. not insured or bonded for
bodily injury liability at the
time of the accident; or
b. insured or bonded for bodily
injury liability at the time of
the accident; but
(1) the limits of liability are
less than the minimum
limits required by section 31A-22-304 of the
Utah Insurance Laws.
The minimum required
limits are $25,006 for
each person and $50,000
for each accident; or
(2) the insuring company
denies coverage or is or
becomes insolvent; or
(3) coverage for an accident
is disputed by the liability insurer for more than
60 days; or
2. an unidentified land motor vehicle which was the proximate
cause of the bodily injury. If the
unidentified land motor vehicle
does not strike either the insured
or the vehicle the insured is oc*
cupying, the insured must show
the existence of the other motor
vehicle by clear and convincing
evidence, which shall consist of
more than the insured's testimony.
c. The second paragraph under UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE — COVERAGE W is changed to read:
We will pay damages for bodily injury
an insured is legally entitled to collect
from the owner or driver of an under*
insured motor vehicle. The bodily
injury must be sustained by an insured
and caused by accident arising out of
the operation, maintenance or use of an
underinsurcd motor vehicle.
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d.

Item 1 of Limits of Liability — Coverage
V is changed lo read:
1. The amount of coverage is shown
on the declarations page under
"Limits of Liability — U — Each
Person, Each Accident" Under
"Each Person" is the amount of
coverage for all damages due to
bodily injury lo one person
"Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury and damages to
others resulting from this bodily
injury, and all emotional distress
resulting from this bodily injury
sustained by other persons who
do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total
amount of coverage, subject to
the amount shown under "Each
Person'*, for all damages due to
bodily inmry to two or more per*
sons in the same accident.

e.

Item 1 of Limits of Liability — Coverage
W is changed to read
1. The amount of coverage is shown
on the declarations page under
"Limits of Liability — W —
Each Person, Each Accident".
Under "Each Person" is the
amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one
person. "Bodily injury to one
person" includes all injury and
damages to others resulting from
this boddy injury^ and all emotional distress resulting from this
bodily injury sustained by other
persons who do not sustain bodily
injury. Under "Each Accident" is
the total amount of coverage,
subject to the amount shown under "Each Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two
or more persons in the same accident.
5. SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COVERAGES
a

Item 2 under COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE D is changed to read
2 We will pay you for transportation costs incurred if your car is
stolen We will pay up to $25 per
day beginning when you tell us of
the theft and ending when we offer to pay for the loss

If the daily incurred transportation costs are payable under both
Comprehensive Coverage and
Car Rental and Travel Expenses
Coverage, we will pay only under
the one coverage where you collect the most If payments have
been made under Car Rental and
Tiavcl Expenses Coverage and
such payments have either exhausted the total amount payable
under Car Rental Expense or reduced the total amount payable
under Car Rental Expense to less
than $25, then we will pay under
Comprehensive Coverage
b

c.

d.

The followineisadded to EMERGENCY
ROAD SERVICE — COVERAGE H:
5 locksmith services, up to one hour,
to open your car ityour key is lost,
stolen or locked inside your car. We
will pay only the cost of labor.
The last paragraph under CAR RENTAL
EXPENSE — COVERAGE R is
changed to read;
If die incurred daily rental charge is payable under both Comprehensive Coverage and Car Rental Expense Coverage,
we will pay only under the one coverage
whereyoiJ collect the most
The last paragraph of item I under CAR
RENTAL AND TRAVEL EXPENSES
— COVERAGE Rl is changed to read
If the incurred daily rental charge is
payable under" both Comprehensive
Coverage and Car Rental and Travel
Expenses Coverage, we will pay only
under the one coverage where you
collect the most.

e.

Item I of If There Is Other Coverage is
changed to read:
L Policies Issued by Us to You,
Your Spouse, or Any Relative
If two or more vehicle policies issued by us to you, your spouse or
any rthiHve apply to the same loss
or occurrence, we will pay under the
policy with the highest lumL
I. CONDITIONS
Item a under 1. Policy Changes is changed lo read
a.

Policy Terms, The terms of this policy may be changed or waived only
by
6126FA
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{!) an endorsement issued by us; or
(2) the revision of this policy form to
give broader coverage without an extra charge. If any coverage you
caxry is changed to give broader

coverage, we will five you the
broader coverage without the is* u a n c c o f a new policy as of the
date w c makc
the change effec|1VC
'

Chief Executive Officer
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6082P AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement is a part ofyour policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain
the same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different
effective date is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page.
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington,
Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown
by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed your policy is changed as follows:
1. The definition of non-owned ear under
DEFINED WORDS is changed to read:

increased by an additional 21 days for
each such additional policy.

Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned,
registered or leased by:

A non-owned car must be a car in the lawful
possession of the person operating ic

1. you, your spouse;
2. any relative unless at the lime of die
accident or loss:
a. the cor currently is or has within the
last 30 days been insured for liability
coverage; and
b* the driver is an insured who docs not
own or lease the cor;
3. any other person redding in the same
household as you, your spouse or any
relative; or
4. an employer of you, your spouse or any
relative.
Son* owned car does not include a:
1. rented car while it is used in connection
with the insured's employment or business; or
2. car which has been operated oriented by
or in the possession of an insured during
any pan of each of the last 21 or more
consecutive days. If the insured is an
insured under one or more other car policies issued by us, the 21 day limit is

1

REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S
DUTIES
a. The following provision is added to item 4;
The person making claim also shall answer
questions under oath when asked by anyone
we name* as often as we reasonably ask, and
sign copies of the answers.
b. Item 4b is changed to read:
Tut person making claim also shall:
b. be examined by physicians chosen
and paid by us as often as we reasonably may require. A copy of the
report will be sent to tit person upon
writtenrequest.The person, or his or
her legal representative if the person
is dead or unable to act, shall author*
ize us to obtain all medical reports
and records.

3. SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COVERAGES
a. The provision titled Limit of liability Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is
changed to read:
6082P
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The limit of our liability for loss to property or any part of it is the lower of:
1. die actual cash value; or
2. the cost of repair or replacement.
Actual cash value is determined by the
market value, age and condition at the
time the loss occurred Any deductible
amount that applies is then subtracted.
The cost of repair or replacement is based
upon one of the following:
1. the cost of repair or replacement
agreed upon by you and us;
2. a competitive bid approved by us;
or
3. an estimate written based upon
the prevailing competitive price.
The prevailing competitive price
means prices charged by a
majority of the repair market in
the area where the car is to be
repaired as determined by a survey made by us, If jroa ask, we
will identify some facilities that
will perform the repairs at the
prevailing competitive price.
We will include in the estimate
parts sufficient to restore the
vehicle to its prc-loss condition.
You agree with us that such parts
may include either parts fur*
rushed by the vehicle's manufacturer or partsfromother sources
including non-original equipment manufacturers.
Any deductible amount that applies is
then subtracted
b. The first paragraph under Settlement of Loss
-Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
is changed to read

We have therighttosettle a Joss with you
or the owner of die property in one of the
following ways:
1. pay the agreed upon actual cash
value of die property at the time
of the loss in exchange for the
damaged property. If the owner
and we cannot agree on the actual
cash value, either party may
demand an appraisal as described
below. If die owner keeps die
damaged property, we will
deduct its value after the lass
from our payment The damaged
property cannot be abandoned to
us;
Z pay to:
a. repair die damaged propeny
or part or
b. replace the property or part
If the repair or replacement
results in betterment, you must
pay for the amount ofbetterment;
or
3. return the stolen property and pay
for any damage due to the theft
Appraisal under item 1 above
shall be conducted according to
the following procedure. Each
party shall select an appraiser.
These two shall select a third appraiser. The written decision of
any two appraisers shall be binding. The cost of the appraiser
shall be paid by the party who
hired him or her. The cost of the
third appraiser and other appraisal
expenses shall be shared equally
by both parties. We do not waive
any of our rights by agreeing to an
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appraisal. We have the right to
move the damaged property, at
our expense, to reduce storage
costs during the appraisal process.
The Settlement of Loss provision for
comprehensive and collision coverages
incorporates the limit of Liability provision of those coverages.

has not been used or rented by. or in
the possession ofyou, your spouse or
any relative during any part of each
of the last 21 or more consecutive
days. Uyou are insured by one or
more other car policies issued by us,
the 21 day limit is increased by an
additional 21 days for each such
additional policy; and

c. Trailer Coverage
Itemsbandc under "A non-owned trailer or
detachable living quarters unit is one that:"
are changed to read:

c. is not rented and used in connection
with the employment or business of
you, your spouse or any relative.

<5sbj<>*SP^«*V9r
President

6082P

Iverson, Joni v. SFMAIC
IVERSONO0000319PROD

35BF9
I ItATt U U I |

04*08-94

DECLARATIONS PAGE

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

I—'d

30019™ AVENUE GrUXLCY, CO 80630
NAMED INSURED

POUCYNUKBER

POLICY PERioo
44-1379-47 B
IVERSON, CARTER 0
5795 N 4900 W
BEAR RIVER CJTYUT 84301
DESCRIBED
VEHICLE

YEAR

r24

847W312-44B

MAR-30-94 TO SEP-12-94

DO NOT PAY PREMIUMS SHOWN ON THIS PAGE.
SEPARATE STATEMENT ENCLOSED JF AMOUNT DUE.

MAKE

U0DEL

cf**uc

SUNBIRD

BODY STYLE
CDtjy

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

CUSS

im.\KUMP7*xm

COVERAGES (AS DEFINED IN POLICY
SYMBOL-PBEMIUU-CCVERAGE NAMEiMITS OF LIABILITY

$ 62.05

P3
D50
G100

H
U

w

$17.82
$76.63
$106.27
$ 2.16
$ 4.05

$ £70

BODILY INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE UABIUTY
LIMITS OF LIABIUTY-COVERAGE A-BODILY INJURY
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT
50,000
100,000
LIMITS OF LIABIUTY-COVERAGE ^PROPERTY DAMAGE
EACH ACCIDENT
50,000
NO-FAULT (SEE POLICY SCHEDULE FOR LIMITS.)
$50 DEDUCTIBLE COMPREHENSIVE
$100 DEDUCTIBLE COLLISION
EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
LIMITS OF LIABILITY-U
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT
25,000
50,000
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
LIMITS OF UABIUTY-W
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDENT
10,000
20,000

$271.68TOTAL PREMIUM FOR POLICY PERIOD MAR-30-94 TO SEP-12-94
$301.86 CURRENT 6 MONTH PREMIUM FOR MAR-12-94 TO SEP-12-94
EXCEPTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS
FINANCED-FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH NA, PO BOX 8126, WALNUT CREEK, CA
94596-8126.
6078FF.1 AMENDMENT OF NO FAULT-COVERAGE P.
6082P
AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT: CHANGES-DEFINED WORDS; INSURED'S DUTIES;
COVERAGES.
68B5EE.1 AMENDMENT OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE U AND UNDERINSURED
MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE W.

THIS IS YOUR DECLARATIONS PAGE.
PLEASE ATTACH IT TO YOUR AUTO POLICY BOOKLET.

AGENT; RON JEPPESEN
PHONE (801) 257-3940

YOUR POLICY CONSISTS OF THIS PAGE, ANY ENDORSEMENTS. AND THE POLICY BOOKLET, FORM 9 8 4 4 . 3
REPLACED" POLICY 7 2 4 8 4 7 9 - 4 4 A

137947

PLEASE KEEP TOGETHER
155-4976
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